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TALENTS, ABILITIES AND VIRTUES
ROBIN ATTFIELD
HUME REGARDS it as a mere "Verbal Dispute"1 whether or not various
"natural abilities" should be regarded as moral virtues. In his Treatise he
complains that "good sense and judgment", "parts and understanding"
are classed in all systems of ethics of the day with bodily endowments and
ascribed no "merit or moral worth".2 Yet if compared with the received
virtues, they fell short in no material respect, both sets being "mental
qualities" and each equally tending to procure "the love and esteem of
mankind".
But Hume's opponents saw the distinction as of great importance.
"Those who represent the distinction betwixt natural abilities and moral
virtues as very material . . . say that the former are entirely involuntary
and have therefore no merit attending them, as having no dependence on
liberty and freewill."3 Hume is thus denying that there is any important
difference not only between natural abilities and moral virtues, but also
between mental qualities not in any way dependent on choice and mental
qualities dependent on choice. For it is his view not only that there are
some natural abilities which might just as easily be included in the list of
the virtues as excluded from it, but also that non-voluntariness is no bar
to inclusion, and that inclusion is just as possible whether a quality is in
some way voluntary or not. But since this view implies that people may
justly be blamed for what is no fault of their own, as well as praised for
what is no merit of their own, Hume would seem to be wrong in holding
that the dispute about the classification of the "natural abilities" is merely
verbal. At the same time Hume seems to be right and his opponents
wrong in holding that some qualities, currently not regarded as virtuous,
might equally well be so regarded.
Hume's first reply to his opponents is to the effect that not even for
qualities traditionally virtuous is voluntariness necessary. Thus "con-
stancy, fortitude and magnanimity" are just as involuntary as "the qualities
of the judgment and the imagination".4 Now certainly few can change
their character at will, and these qualities of the "great man" may be
harder to attain by trying than most. Yet we do ordinarily suppose that a
man deserves credit for his own character and is in some measure respon-
sible for it, having acquired it in part as a result of his own past choices.
So to make this reply stick, Hume would have to adduce grounds for
supposing that a man has no share in forming his own dispositions. Now
there is certainly a special difficulty in the case of virtues not accessible to
all. Over the classical concept of "magnanimity" Hume could point out
that appropriate conduct is not within the reach of the majority, since
wealth and status are prerequisites. But even this does not show that
voluntariness may be absent from magnanimity in the cases of those who
do attain it. Nor is lack of magninimity held to be a vice in those who
lack the wherewithal. Yet Hume may, paradoxically, be right over one
matter here: for, since certain qualities of the judgment and the imagina-
tion, such as discretion and moral sensitivity, may plausibly be held to be
affected by a man's past choices, they are thus voluntary to exactly the
same degree as constancy, fortitude and magnanimity. Thus, when, in
Appendix IV of the Inquiry, Hume holds that there is no bar to holding
certain intellectual qualities, "prudence, penetration, discernment, discre-
tion"5 as virtues there need be no objection in point of voluntariness. For
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these qualities, as also "constancy, fortitude and magnanimity", are much
more voluntary than Hume supposes.
Hume's second reply runs as follows. "I would have any one give me
a reason why virtue and vice may not be involuntary, as well as beauty and
deformity. These moral distinctions arise from natural distinctions of
pain and pleasure; and when we receive those feelings from the general
consideration of any quality or character we denominate it vicious or vir-
tuous. Now I believe no one will assert, that a quality can never produce
pleasure or pain to the person who considers it, unless it be perfectly
voluntary in the person who possesses it".
We can probably assume here that by pain and pleasure, Hume intends
disapproval and approval. And Hume is, if so, maintaining that a quality
habitually and generally approved is a virtue and a quality habitually and
generally disapproved is a vice. He then adds that voluntariness is not
necessary in qualities for them to be approved. This point has some
plausibility: for we praise many qualities which are in no way due to
the credit of the person who bears them, e.g. beauty, artlessness, flair, intel-
ligence (in at least one sense), and generally gifts of all kinds. Indeed we
often praise the bearers of these qualities, as Hume himself points out at
the end of Inquiry, Appendix IV.6 But this is only possible because not
all praise is moral praise, nor all approval moral approval. Were every
case of our approval and disapproval a case of moral approval or dis-
approval, people could justly be berated for misfortunes such as nervous-
ness, ignorance or uncultivatedness of upbringing. It is therefore im-
portant that these misfortunes are not vices.
To be fair to Hume, he has the consistency to consider at Treatise Book
III, Part III, Section V7 whether physical attractiveness as well as mental
qualities should be regarded as a virtue: but he is led to this kind of posi-
tion by his own theory that a virtue is any quality which occasions pleasure
through either its utility or agreeableness either to its possessor or to
others. It should be admitted that Hume sees some of the difficulties: "A
convenient house and a virtuous character cause not the same feeling of
approbation, even though the source of our approbation be the same, and
flow from sympathy and an idea of utility".8 This variation Hume finds
inexplicable: had he followed it up he would have discovered that of these
qualities which we disapprove only some are qualities logically appropriate
for indignation, while others are rather matters of regret or pity instead.
Hume is effectively proposing a conceptual reform by which the under-
privileged could legitimately be censured. Again the distinction Hume is
disputing emerges as hardly trivial.
Hume's third reply is that free will is irrelevant among possible require-
ments for a quality to be a virtue, for to be voluntary, actions do not have
to be free. Hume is here appealing to his own attempted refutation of
libertarianism at Treatise Book II: Part III: Section I and II.9 There he
maintains that praise, blame, rewards and punishments are only conceivable
let alone just, if the actions of the persons so treated are caused by the
character of the person concerned. The theory that free will involves
determinism has been adequately discussed by Mrs. Foot,10 and I do not
mean to discuss it here. For even if Hume is right voluntariness, though
not freedom, could still be required of a quality by his opponents before it
was recognized as a virtue. Thus all Hume's replies miscarry.
The passage which follows reveals the identity of Hume's opponents.11
It is observed by sundry legislators, divines and moralists that natural
abilities admit of little improvement whatever rewards punishments,
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praise or blame are essayed, whereas the so-called moral virtues do respond
to this treatment. And this accounts for the invention of the distinction
between virtues and natural abilities. Wherever incentives and deterrents
are of use, moralists devise an artificial distinction to liegitimize their activi-
ties. Hume now derides the narrowness of the theologians' list of virtues
by pointing out how in the ancient world prudence headed the list of the
cardinal virtues.
At this point both Hume and, if he reports them aright, his opponents,
seem to be labouring under a misapprehension. For, as noted above,
certain intellectual qualities such as discretion are just as voluntary as
virtues like constancy. It may be pointless to exhort men to be prudent,
but there is no reason why such exhortation, whenever it occurs, should not
succeed. Thus if voluntariness were the sole difficulty, the theologians
could have joined Hume in regarding his list of mental qualities, "industry,
perseverance, patience, activity, vigilance, application, constancy" as a
list of virtues.12 Most probably the theologians' real objection was to the
self-regardingness of these intellectual qualities, and not to their supposed
lack of voluntariness.
On this score, we should perhaps do well to side with Hume. If, as has
been argued by R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer,13 there is a duty to
respect the distinctive human endowment as we find it in ourselves, then
there are self-regarding virtues such as self-control and fostering one's own
rationality. Indeed some opportunities for prudence will involve the
duty of being prudent, such as when we have the chance to develop our
own talents, and are under no obligation to anyone else to desist or do
something else instead. Moreover any exercise of our own rationality will
be ceteris paribus a mark of virtue. Hume, in a footnote in Appendix IV
of his Inquiry, notes that were Cicero "now alive, it would be found
difficult to persuade him that no qualities were to be admitted as virtues
or acknowledged to be a part of personal merit, but what were recom-
mended by 'The Whole Duty of M a n ' " (a devotional handbook by a
royalist divine, probably Allestree). We have now seen grounds for
agreeing with Cicero, whose list of virtues includes intellectual as well as
"moral" ones.*4
It now becomes clear why Hume thought it was only arbitrariness which
prevented the natural abilities being regarded as virtues. Most of the
examples he had in mind, e.g. "good sense and judgment" "parts and
understanding", were intellectual qualities which were despised by con-
temporary theologians but for not dissociating which from the virtues
there were good grounds. These examples might be classed as "intellectual
dispositions whose acquisition involves effort and beneficial to oneself".
Hume unfortunately misclassified them as natural abilities (too wide a
category and misleading because it includes talents), or, in his Inquiry, as
talents (the wrong category altogether). For some natural abilities like
charm and (in at least one sense) intelligence do not involve effort, and
talents are unlike the intellectual dispositions mentioned above in precisely
this same respect. Again, certain misfortunes such as dullness of charac-
ter or lack of polish do not reflect adversely on the past choices of their
possessors: as qualities they may be disapproved, but we do not in justice
or in logic blame these unfortunate people because of these deficiencies.
On the other hand the intellectual dispositions mentioned above may fitly
be classed as virtues, without our at the same time including among the
virtues capacities and talents whose possession is asset but not merit, and
whose absence misfortune but no reproach.
University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire, Cardiff
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